tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8861197.post6940547214825197174..comments2023-06-27T16:51:05.805+02:00Comments on The Pangrammaticon: Correcting WilliamsThomashttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04858865501469168339noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8861197.post-55705176419188081392009-05-16T06:07:00.000+02:002009-05-16T06:07:00.000+02:00I very much agree. Great post.I very much agree. Great post.Laura Carterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01832602235979342724noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8861197.post-23555429608762505492009-05-15T21:27:00.000+02:002009-05-15T21:27:00.000+02:00"Rules are to practice what apparatuses are to his..."Rules are to practice what apparatuses are to history" is certainly not a <I>pangrammatical</I> homology. But I suppose the question is whether it captures a formal likeness. If apparatuses are rule-totalities (aggregations of regulations) then they condition historical events "just as" rules condition practical events. The formal likeness obtains in so far as histories are aggregations of practices. History (the whole shebang!), then, would aggregate the totality of practices. I would agree with that.Thomashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04858865501469168339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8861197.post-66835184519299901272009-05-15T17:44:00.000+02:002009-05-15T17:44:00.000+02:00Or to spell out the self-centred concern that is t...Or to spell out the self-centred concern that is the cause of my interest in this question: <br /><br />I’ve been thinking about what the heck it is that I’ve been doing in my dissertation and by applying Weick’s principles of retrospective sensemaking (kidding, of course!) I’ve arrived at the conclusion that some of it might be summed up by saying: Norms are to action what rules are to practice. And rules are to practice what apparatuses are to history.<br /><br />This sort of thing, of course, only makes sense after we realize that (Wittgensteinian) rules and (Foucauldian) apparatuses are not the sort of rigid things that we might imagine them to be.<br /><br />Now, I don’t intend such statements to be pangrammatical nor even grammatical; they are, as it were, substantial.<br /><br />Now, “Norms are to actions what rules are to practice.” strikes me as an analogy. While “Rules are to practice what apparatuses are to history.” strikes me as an homology proper. <br /><br />Wouldn’t you, prima facie, agree?Presskornhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03480116067878605339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8861197.post-78900550298873500152009-05-15T17:14:00.000+02:002009-05-15T17:14:00.000+02:00Hmmm, yes, helpful. Though it'd be interesting to ...Hmmm, yes, helpful. Though it'd be interesting to hear your take on why Aristotle and Kant's examples are definitely NOT homologies.(This question still strikes me as slightly different from the question of why they are analogies - logically, of course, this is in confusion. But that's just the thing about confusions; they are seldomly logical.)Presskornhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03480116067878605339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8861197.post-52780741880715237442009-05-15T16:09:00.000+02:002009-05-15T16:09:00.000+02:00, I've definitely had the content/form distinction..., I've definitely had the content/form distinction in mind.<br /><br />Take a standard pangrammatical homology:<br /><br />Knowlegde is to scientists as power is to politicians.<br /><br />Now, there are probably a number of interesting analogies between the work of scientists and that of politicians. And these do sometimes inspire me. But what I am interested in is the moment when through a kind of poetico-philosophical "thickening" (Dichtung) these analogies become formal correspondences.<br /><br />For example, there is nothing very analogous about laboratories and parliaments. But they are, I submit, grammatically homologous qua knowledge/power.Thomashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04858865501469168339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8861197.post-12638923985735889392009-05-15T15:31:00.000+02:002009-05-15T15:31:00.000+02:00Question somewhat unrelated to the post, but of ge...Question somewhat unrelated to the post, but of general relevance to ’The Pangrammaticon’:<br /><br />What really sets your propositions off as ‘homologies’ rather than ‘analogies’?<br /><br />Aristotle in Topics calls this an analogy: “Knowledge is to the object of knowledge as sensation is to the object of sensation.” <br /><br />And Kant in Prolegomena calls this an analogy: “The welfare of children is to the love of parents as the welfare of humans is to the love of God.” <br /><br />And presumably you would for instance call this a homology: “Science is to intuition what politics is to institution.”<br /><br />I know the standard dictionary entry stating that analogies goes content, while homologies goes to form – and the standard examples saying for instance that “wings” are homologues of “arms”, but not analogies of “arms” - but I am a bit uncertain as to how to apply this distinction in these cases. I seem to be missing the relevant clue?Presskornhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03480116067878605339noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8861197.post-52854458533592801162009-05-13T21:57:00.000+02:002009-05-13T21:57:00.000+02:00not sure if I'm just talking past some of the thin...not sure if I'm just talking past some of the things here, but I thought your post was very interesting and it made me want to flesh out some of <A HREF="http://pathologos.blogspot.com/2009/05/no-ideas-but-in-things.html" REL="nofollow">my own ideas</A> about the Williams mantra.Iainhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15197666388360786350noreply@blogger.com