I just made another change to 6.53 of the Tractatus Pathetico-Poeticus. I have been trying to come up with something that one could be as critical (in a somewhat Kantian sense) of in poetry as Wittgenstein was of metaphysics. I think I've hit on something here, namely, that metaphysics is to philosophy what anthropology is to poetry. The consequences are quite striking, though right now, I admit, they will be clear mostly to be people who are more into the Heidegger-Deleuze-Negri-Agamben assemblage than I am. If that means you, read on, otherwise wait until I post passages from the Tractatus that address the metaphysics/anthropology transpositions. (Remark 4b below, however, especially when read along with 6.53, almost makes independent sense, though still depending on your background. Try that first, maybe.)
Notes on Ethnicity and Onticity
The items on the following list are pangrammatically homological.
Science : Politics
Epistemology : Ethics
Metaphysics : Anthropology
Theory : Practice
Ontology : Ethnography
Onticity : Ethnicity
Empirical : Normative
Facticity : Activity
Facts : Acts
Objects : Subjects
Things : People
World : History
Here are some consequences. This is still in rough form, preserving analogies at the expense of readability and making use of terms better (though not perfectly) available in Heidegger's phenomenology than Wittgenstein's logic.
1a. Anthropology is the account of human culture, or of human becoming quite generally, i.e., it is the account of “who is to come in history”, since our culture is always only the becoming of “the people to come”.
1b. Metaphysics is the account of human nature, or of human being quite generally, i.e., it is the account of “what there is in the world”, since our nature is always only the being of “the things that are”.
2. Anthropology is to politics what metaphysics is to science. Anthropology is politics without mandate, just as metaphysics is science without method.
3. Ontology is metaphysics when confined to the analysis of a specific theory, just as ethnography is the anthropology of specific practices.
4a. Onticity is not a property of theories (an ontology is an aspect of a theory, i.e., it is the account of “what there is” that the theory refers to), onticity is a property of empirical phenomena, it is the aspect of experience that stands in relation to the ontology of a specific theory. I.e., the onticity of experience is the sense in which it displays or instantiates the ontology (the account of what there is).
4b. Ethnicity is not proper to practices (an ethnography is an aspect of a practice, i.e., it is the depiction of “who is coming” that the practice defers to), ethnicity is proper to normative phenomena, it is the aspect of experience that stands in relation to the ethnography of a specific practice. I.e., the ethnicity of experience is the motive by which it displays and instantiates the ethnography (the picture of who is coming).
5a. While the onticity of experience construes phenomena according to the ontology of a theory, their facticity is apparent on their construal in terms that indicate their objectivity, or rather, facticity is the order of experience that can be established among phenomena qua empirical facts. More colloquially, the onticity of things indicates the ontology of the theory in terms of which we observe it, while their facticity indicates the objective relations that may be established between them and other things.
5b. While the ethnicity of experience construes phenomena according to the ethnography of a practice, their activity surfaces on their construal in terms that indicate their subjectivity, or rather, activity is the order of experience that can be established among phenomena qua normative acts. More colloquially, the ethnicity of people indicates the ethnography of the practice in terms by which we negotiate them, while their activity indicates the subjective positions that may be established among them and other people.