"Notational irregularities are often the first
sign of philosophical errors."
Two quick corrections to earlier posts. It is important to transpose all terms correctly to preserve harmony. On the other hand, imperfections of notation here may be the way the light gets in.
In "Decency", I had written.
"Intense concepts make us able to articulate desire; we become capable of saying how we feel."
"Intense emotions make us able to articulate desire; we become capable of saying how we feel."
"The Critique of Pure Passion?" was a rough sketch. I have polished it a bit:
Institution is that through which power is immediately related to subjects, and to which all feeling is directed as an end. But institution finds its moment only in so far as the subject is taken with stuff. This, again, is only possible in so far as the mind is affective in a certain way. The capacity for imposing representations through the mode in which we are affective subjects, is called motility. Subjects are taken with stuff with the aim of motility, and it alone yields us institutions; they are felt through overbearance, and from this overbearance emotions arise. But all feeling must, either directly, or indirectly by way of certain marks, relate ultimately to institutions, and therefore, as far as stuff is concerned, to motility, because in no other way can a subject be taken with stuff. The effect of a subject upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by it, is called motivation. That institution which is in relation to the subject through motivation, is entitled normative. The undetermined subject of a normative institution is called a surface.
I find it quite illuminating.